A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, vertue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]

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Author:	Edwards, Jonathan, 1703-1758.
Title:	A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, vertue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]
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Subject terms:	Kames, Henry Home, -- Lord, 1696-1782. -- Essays on the principles of morality and natural religion. Free will and determinism. Subscribers' lists.
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Table of Contents

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title page

THE PREFACE.

A General TABLE Of the CONTENTS.

part

conclusion

PART I. Wherein are explained and stated various Terms and Things belonging to the Sub|ject of the ensuing Discourse.

SECTION I. Concerning the Nature of the Will.

SECTION II. Concerning the Determination of the Will.

SECTION III. Concerning the Meaning of the Terms Ne|cessity, Impossibility, Inability, &c; and of Contingence.

SECTION IV. Of the Distinction of natural and moral Necessity, and Inability.

SECTION V. Concerning the Notion of Liberty, and of moral Agency.

PART II. Wherein it is considered whether there is or can be any such Sort of FREEDOM OF WILL, as that wherein Arminians place the Essence of the Liberty of all moral Agents; and whether any such Thing ever was or can be conceived of.

SECTION I. Shewing the manifest Inconsistence of the Arminian Notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in the Will's self-determining Power.

SECTION II. Several supposed Ways of evading the fore|going Reasoning, considered.

SECTION III. Whether any Event whatsoever, and Volition in particular, can come to pass without a Cause of it's Existence.

SECTION IV. Whether Volition can arise without a Cause, through the Activity of the Nature of the Soul.

SECTION V. Shewing, that if the Things asserted in these Evasions should be supposed to be true, they are altogether impertinent, and can't help the Cause of Arminian Liberty; And how (this being the State of the Case) Arminian Writers are obliged to talk in|consistently.

SECTION VI. Concerning the Will's determining in Things which are perfectly indifferent, in the View of the Mind.

SECTION VII. Concerning the Notion of Liberty of Will consisting in Indifference.

SECTION VIII. Concerning the supposed Liberty of the Will, as opposite to all Necessity.

SECTION IX. Of the Connection of the Acts of the Will with the Dictates of the Understanding.

SECTION X. Volition necessarily connected with the Influ|ence of Motives; with particular Obser|vations on the great Inconsistence of Mr. Chubb's Assertions and Reasonings, about the Freedom of the Will.

SECTION XI. The Evidence of GOD's certain Foreknow|ledge of the Volitions of moral Agents.

SECTION XII. GOD's certain Foreknowledge of the future Volitions of moral Agents, inconsistent with such a Contingence of those Volitions, as is without all Necessity.

SECTION XIII. Whether we suppose the Volitions of moral Agents to be connected with any Thing antecedent, or not, yet they must be ne|cessary in such a Sense as to overthrow Arminian Liberty.

PART III. Wherein is enquired, whether any such Liberty of Will as Arminians hold, be necessary to MORAL AGENCY, VERTUE and VICE, PRAISE, and DISPRAISE, &c.

SECTION I. GOD's moral Excellency necessary, yet vertuous and praise-worthy.

SECTION II. The Acts of the Will of the human Soul of JESUS CHRIST necessarily holy, yet truly vertuous, praise-worthy, rewardable, &c.

SECTION III. The Case of such as are given up of God to Sin, and of fallen Man in general, proves moral Necessity and Inability to be con|sistent with Blame-worthiness.

SECTION IV. Command, and Obligation to Obedience, consistent with moral Inability to obey.

SECTION V. That Sincerity of Desires and Endeavours, which is supposed to excuse in the Non-performance of Things in themselves good, particularly considered.

SECTION VI. Liberty of Indifference, not only not ne|cessary to Vertue, but utterly inconsistent with it; And all, either vertuous or vi|cious Habits or Inclinations, inconsistent with Arminian Notions of Liberty and moral Agency.

SECTION VII. Arminian Notions of moral Agency incon|sistent with all Influence of Motive and Inducement, in either vertuous or vicious Actions.

PART IV. Wherein the chief Grounds of the Reason|ings of Arminians, in Support and Defence of the foremention'd Notions of Liberty, moral Agency, &c. and against the oppo|site Doctrine, are considered.

SECTION I. The Essence of the Vertue and Vice of Dis|positions of the Heart, and Acts of the Will, lies not in their Cause, but their Nature.

SECTION II. The Falseness and Inconsistence of that meta|physical Notion of Action, and Agency, which seems to be generally entertained by the Defenders of the Arminian Doctrine concerning Liberty, moral Agency, &c.

SECTION III. The Reasons why some think it contrary to common Sense, to suppose those Things which are necessary, to be worthy of either Praise or Blame.

SECTION IV. It is agreable to common Sense, and the na|tural Notions of Mankind, to suppose moral Necessity to be consistent with Praise and Blame, Reward and Punishment.

SECTION V. Concerning those Objections, that this Scheme of Necessity renders all Means and En|deavours for the avoiding of Sin, or the obtaining Vertue and Holiness, vain, and to no Purpose; and that it makes Men no more than meer Machines in Affairs of Morality and Religion.

SECTION VI. Concerning that Objection against the Doc|trine which has been maintain'd, that it agrees with the Stoical Doctrine of Fate, and the Opinions of Mr. Hobbes.

SECTION VII. Concerning the Necessity of the Divine Will.

SECTION VIII. Some further Objections against the moral Necessity of GOD'S Volitions considered.

SECTION IX. Concerning that Objection against the Doc|trine which has been maintain'd, that it makes GOD the Author of Sin.

SECTION X. Concerning Sin's first Entrance into the World.

SECTION XI. Of a supposed Inconsistence of these Prin|ciples, with GOD's moral Character.

SECTION XII. Of a supposed Tendency of these Principles to Atheism and Licentiousness.

SECTION XIII. Concerning that Objection against the Rea|soning, by which the Calvinistic Doctrine is supported, that it is Metaphysical and Abstruse.

THE CONCLUSION.

INDEX.

Advertisement. ERRATA.

A LIST of SUBSCRIBERS, in Alphabetical Order.

part